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Abstract: Crisis clearly distinguishes itself from the large mass of economic 
phenomena through its provocative force, which fuels theoretical discourse. 
The more harmful, the more generous the energies it deploys and consumes for 
explanatory and obstacle overcoming purposes. The result is that every crisis 
teaches us a lesson. What interests us is who writes and who learns from this 
lesson, and if they do. Then we try to find why serious crises, like the current 
one, occur once or twice in a century. What is the role that big world market 
players have in crisis “preparation”, onset and resorption? Do solutions 
originate in the state’s support or in the market? Does globalization erase 
national borders in such situations? How and to what extent real economy 
may penalize a guilty party that constantly comes from nominal economy? 
What are the problems raised by such an outcome for the strategy to follow 
and for economic sciences in general, etc.?  
Keywords: crisis, Keynes, truth, compromise, market, state, human nature, 
speculation, indebtedness, personal calculation 
JEL classification: E12, E44, E60, N10. 
1.DO LESSONS ON CRISIS HAVE A HISTORICAL NATURE?
In order to answer the simplistic however, we believe, easily 
accountable for interrogation in the title, we are first tempted to make the 
following simple statement: crises teach us nothing or almost nothing, since 
they keep occurring at certain time intervals, ruining our plans and making us 
start over. Or, to be more precise, we could say that they teach us something, 
but this lesson is useless. Why? Because our knowledge, put into perspective 
by historical events, will serve the generations that follow us at centennial 
intervals.  
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We should however remind you that, starting with 1825, the world 
economy has had a cyclic development. Growth and progress were not 
brought about by linearity, but by winding developments, by uphill and 
downhill evolution, by phenomena such as crisis, depression, revival and 
boom. Heaps of books have been written and Nobel prizes have been won on 
this extremely interesting subject, which is the hard core of economic theory. 
Economic politics inspired by this theory managed a praiseworthy and at the 
same time noteworthy accomplishment; it managed to smooth sinusoidal 
curves and basically to prevent the turning of the wave top, called expansion, 
into a crisis. The cycle was thus reduced to two significant boom stages and 
recession. Crises were avoided or “managed” to become bearable. In two 
historic cases however economic policies failed to avoid serious crises: 1929-
1933 and 2007-200?. These are two unheard of before situations, whose 
extent and consequences cannot be matched by any other economic 
phenomenon. It is these phenomena, and especially the latter, that we have in 
view when trying to find the point of a lesson on crises.  
We know therefore, from what others told us and from what we are currently 
experiencing, that the moment called crisis is a highest intensity implosion and 
explosion event, which includes an unmatched variety of economic phenomena and 
processes, and which has the largest geographical spreading and the highest 
temporal concentration. It is in its nature not to pass unnoticed. It is disturbing, it 
determines standpoints, it changes matrixes or governments, it revises and updates 
discourse, etc., in a word, it requires study and examination. And this is what it gets. 
The generation that experiences it writes the lesson down, through its most 
representative scientists. It should normally be passed on to be learned and 
considered. What actually happens is that it is historicized, packed and sent to the 
past to be labeled: “to whom it is interested in the subject”. Once “there”, this 
knowledge gets patina, becomes relative or is simply lost. If this phenomenon 
occurred more frequently, this knowledge would be like the words in a foreign 
language that you learn, you do not speak for a while but surprisingly comes back to 
you when you need it. Unfortunately, this is not the case, since the following big 
crisis is experienced by another generation, the third or fourth, and it is interpreted in 
another language and according to a new paradigm.  
And one more thing: crisis does not teach us all the same thing. Although 
crisis is a sum of negative phenomena, it does not leave a desert behind it. During 
and after a crisis, most of the people have lost something. They learn from their 
mistakes and their lesson takes the form of a set of sentences that teach their 
followers, a century later, what they should not do to avoid danger. Others, however, 
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make a profit during crises. As already explained, passing on this lesson (regardless 
of its nature) through time will probably be either put into perspective, or simply 
lost.
 The extent of the phenomenon, as well as its dramatic consequences, should 
keep this lesson alive; it should be taught in class, as we like to put it. It should be 
included in a “National Economy” textbook, including success case reports as well 
as failure case reports, plus accounts of world crisis and the way in which national 
economy answered it and managed to overcome it. Such a book would round up the 
academic curriculum, it would give it meaning and make it more attractive, at least 
in some social education fields. 
2.CRISIS IS A FUNDAMENTALLY ECONOMIC PHENOMENON.I TS MOMENT OF 
GRACE, PEAK AND SOCIAL CHARACTER
The world is virtually in crisis until the streets fill with unemployed people. 
Remaining in the virtual stage and preventing the wave from breaking in foams, by 
resorption, is a wise politics proof; the ultimate proof would be however preventing 
the wave from occurring altogether. The toughest lesson that crisis teaches us is that 
concerning such moments. Social breakouts are actually the extinction with sparks 
and tragedies of large economic latent conflicts, present in all the cycle stages but 
manifesting themselves through explosions in the actual crisis stage, when mass 
unemployment reaches its peak. We speak of fact and idea conflicts, of 
insurmountable contradictions between production and consumption, real and 
nominal economy, micro, macro and global viewpoints; between the actual events 
and the theoretical orthodoxy, which provides neither explanations nor solutions for 
what happens in the real world. It is a time when economists are accused of 
everything, including imposture and occultism, and economic sciences look 
suspicious. Before the outrageous and dramatic show of the game field occupied by 
unemployed people, politicians are forced to acknowledge what they failed to 
acknowledge apriori, namely that economic balance means nothing without social 
peace. And they are forced to acknowledge it because, as J.M. Keynes put it talking 
about the “outcome” of the big crisis in the 1930’s, “…Men will not always die 
quietly. For starvation, which brings to some lethargy and a helpless despair, drives 
other temperaments to the nervous instability of hysteria and to a mad despair. And 
these in their distress may overturn the remnants of organization, and submerge 
civilization itself in their attempts to satisfy desperately the overwhelming needs of 
the individual. This is the danger against which all our resources and courage and 
idealism must now co-operate” (Keynes, 1919, p.213). Keynes was an 
interventionist with liberal heart. He wrote these lines not out of any special 
fondness for the proletarian cause, but because the facts and events required such a 
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the human factor, if its main coordinate-axis goal is full employment of the work 
force.
We insist on saying that such moments should be avoided, since they 
generally require “mad” solutions, which elude not only the economic status-quo 
logic, but logic in general. The choices are neither dilemmatic, nor metaphysical; 
they become one with and are imposed by the context. Let us consider two
examples, which belong to the same area that made the brilliant Keynes to also 
write less brilliant texts. First of all, being preoccupied and even obsessed with 
finding labor market development solutions, he militates for discouraging savings 
and encouraging investments. Having the unemployment show before his eyes, he 
found investment sources and especially destination less important. He accepts any 
source of investment, including budget deficit (a classical dogma, he believes). 
Moreover, if an investment has a multiplication effect and generates jobs, it may 
even be an unproductive investment. According to this “logic”, Keynes states that 
"…if the Treasury were to fill old bottles with bank notes, bury them at suitable 
depths in disused coal mines which are then filled up to the surface with town 
rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on well-tried principles of laissez-faire to 
dig the notes up again… there need be no more unemployment and, …the real 
income of the community, and its capital wealth also, would probably become a 
great deal greater than it actually is" (Keynes, 1970, p.147). In other words, Keynes 
is trying to say that the streets filled with people are so dangerous to the future of 
social peace that even useless work is acceptable as a “better than nothing” 
alternative. Taken out of their context, Keynes’ lines are simply absurd. We 
understand him only if we consider the time and the context this statement was 
made, which made it possible, in a country with healthy traditions that gave Europe 
princes, confronted with an explosive unemployment rate of up to 60% in the 
industrialized areas of the Ruhr basin, and we refer here to Germany, for a person 
such as Hitler to become “democratically” the country’s ruler only because he 
promised jobs. He actually kept his word, sending them to build roads and weapons. 
History has placed Hitler where he belongs, next to Stalin and other outrageous 
tyrants. The time of such statements is and must however be considered from this 
viewpoint, when such a crisis synthesizing context may be meaningfully “fructified” 
for the future of a nation. Secondly, Keynes is also known as the author of a childish 
reasoning: what does and what does not economy have during crisis? It has 
excessive work force and unused capital. T does not have money, real money, as the 
crisis is actually a crediting money crisis. And, forcing his way into the following 
conclusion, he suggests loud and clear that the gold standard is an annoying 
“barbarian relic”. Economy must be given what it misses and the printing press 
seems the perfect solution. Such reasoning is still encountered today, encouraged by 
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statement. The choice between a visibly “painless” inflation and unemployment, 
which can only be an explosive tragedy, also requires such “mad” solutions. 
3.CRISIS - MOMENT OF TRUTH AND COMPROMISE
Crisis is a moment of truth to the extent it put things where they belong; it 
mainly places nominal economy, made larger by volatilization, on the fundament 
provided by real economy. It is a time when the institution of bankruptcy is called to 
drain and clear the ground, to do its job, to take out of the game the players who 
eluded or gave up good and healthy informal and formal practices, the ones who, 
selling illusions, not only compromised the game, but also altered the results with 
their poisons, turning the GDP in a huge and deceiving roll of cheese full of holes. 
In order for this to happen, the market  needs to be left to do its job. Or, this 
happened neither in the 1929-1933, nor today. In other words, the sanitation 
mechanism is transformed and perverted.  
Crisis is a moment of compromise because the fundamental institution in 
charge of continuously arranging and rearranging competitors depending on their 
results is seriously questioned. From this point of view, the ideas of the studies after 
1929-1933 are not fundamentally different from the current ones. We find that then, 
like today, we developed on the right but we park on the left to find solutions and 
find our way out of the deadlock. And, once here, we call forth the presence of the 
state as the ultimate authority able to reconcile what has proven irreconcilable. We 
feel we should point out that even the purest liberals, starting with Smith, Ricardo, 
Mill, Locke or Ferguson and ending with Mises, Hayek, Friedman, Buchanan, 
Hazlitt or Rothbard, did not think that economy and society as a whole could work 
with the state intervention. In a lawful state that also forces you to see and notice 
what cannot be noticed – the general rules concerning all and each of them – they 
offer the image of the Great Society, a picture of the civilized world, of a world that 
reached prosperity and welfare not by the support of the state and interventionism, 
but by means of the liberal train. The market has always been the fundamental 
institution that made it possible for the “human effort to flourish” as Mises 
synthetically put it; an institution which, together with private property and 
entrepreneurship freedom, define free world; an institution with strong optimizing 
features that forces individuals to take out only what is good in them in order to 
remain in the free competition game and also to support adjusting and reconcile 
individual action plans through the price feed-back mechanism (Hayek, 1990). 
Nevertheless, at times of acute crisis, the market is pointed at incriminatingly, when 
it should be left to clean and penalize excrescences and deviations from the general 
rule of the game. The actions taken are perverse and irrational. The market is 
reprehended and state interventionism if called forth and glorified. Instead of being 
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compromise. Why? Because it is now that can be noticed the perversity of this 
necessary harm called forth to “help”, the compromise with the state. Compromise 
and ultimate meanness, because these are its moments of grace. This is the time 
when it shows what it knows best: it privatizes profit and socializes loss. Now it is 
its chance to appear as an abstract entity beyond and above the people, the large 
category of losers, and close to the few winners, without risking anathema. This 
happens because in these circumstances asking the state for support and regulation 
seems objectively necessary; tragic reality requires it. The “arguments” supporting 
its help are equally numerous and perverse.  
The spectrum of unemployment, generated by an organization’s possibility 
of going bankrupt (companies, banks, insurance companies), weighting heavily on 
the contractual chain of reproduction, is a primary reason for economic analyses. 
These are “so large” that the USA government cannot afford to assist to the macro 
and global economic imbalances or to the social effects of the potential bankruptcy 
of companies such as Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, 
Merill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs etc., the same way that the Benelux 
countries cannot be indifferent to what would happen if one of the biggest European 
banks, Fortis, collapsed; the same way that the Romanian government feels obliged 
to make waves in relation to the potential problems of the “Romanian” banking 
system, although over 90% of its assets are owned by Austrian, German, Italian and 
Greek banks. This means that governments cannot afford exposure; the lesson of the 
market is too tough and would certainly and irremediably render them unpopular. 
This is why they interfere and, via some authorized voices, they implement 
“compensatory mechanisms” generated, allegedly, from beneath market 
coordination. And therefore, they either nationalize (the Fortis case) or “take 
control” (the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), via the central banks (FED in the case 
of the USA), grant loans by proportionally taking over a portion of the shares 
package, inject billions of dollars and Euros on the market and, finally, buy back the 
negative assets of some endangered banking or financial institutions. And all these 
under the pretense of the huge “responsibility”, of the concern for unblocking or 
preventing the stumbling of economy and of restoring the necessary faith for the 
normal development of business. And how can one gain or regain trust if not by 
giving a helping hand to the great ones which, simply due to their specific 
importance, design the anatomy and physiology of economy?  
Another argument refers directly to the endemic market fundamentalism.
Stiglitz, for example, does not shrink from declaring that “neoliberalism is dead”
and that the current market economy is nothing but “a system of corporate wealth, 
protected by market economy”) (Stiglitz, 2008). Not believing that deregulation and 
liberalization lead to efficiency and growth, the Nobel prize laureate is willing to 
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neoliberalism “Socialism takes care of people…neoliberalism helps corporations, 
not people” (Ibidem). When an authorized voice, one that received the Nobel prize, 
sets the choir of anti-deregulation, it gathers up, effortlessly, the necessary team. 
And this is strong, in our case too. The philosophy of deregulation, which started 
with the Washington consensus, with the excessive rendering flexible of the labor 
market, the opening and the liberalization of the capital account, the imperfections 
of the financial market, doubled by the weakness of credit policies, etc., become 
targets that consume high quantities of energy. In a synthesizing sentence, 
functioning as an explanatory thesis for all the damage caused by the current crisis, 
the well known voice of the aristocrat of thought and writing in the field of 
Romanian economy, that of Daniel Dăianu, puts it bluntly: “the main cause of this 
crisis consists in the insufficiency and inadequate regulation of the financial system. 
By this, adds the author, I also refer to the effects of the Phil Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act of 1999…adopted by the USA Congress, and which produced another wave of 
deregulation of the financial industry, leading to the appearance of several 
“synthetic” products (derivatives), very little comprehended in terms of the degree 
of risk they involved” (Dăianu, 2008, p.5).  
This would be the primordial cause, which tainted and brought, via a series of 
equally culpable transmission mechanisms, derivative products, harmful and 
abnormal in their turn: the transformation of loans into bonds, the disregard of a 
minimum level of prudence when taking risks, the misrepresentation of the 
evaluation operations performed by known rating agencies which concealed some 
collateral payment obligations – CDO or CDS, or of some unrestricted speculative 
and indebtedness operations such as leveraging, remuneration mechanisms and 
schemes for the persons with power of decision in some banking, financial or 
economic institutions etc.  
Once entered in the analysis perimeter where we are invited by mister Daianu, 
it is not polite to question his judgment. This is inappropriate and illogical because, 
we repeat, inside this matrix, reality, with its obvious stubbornness, shows that this 
is how things are. The thing is that, if we step outside this perimeter, things look 
different from the surroundings. Briefly, “the blind faith in the efficient operation of 
the financial markets” and the lack of regulation are not responsible for all the things 
that surfaced following the crisis. As a matter of fact, an argument against the 
opinion according to which we are facing a crisis of open capitalism, caused by too 
much deregulation, comes from the very inside of the system struck by the crisis: 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not, by far, deprived of regulation and 
supervision and, despite all these, they were considerably struck; at the same time, 
most speculative funds, such as hedging, oases of almost complete deregulation, do 
not experience problems and are not threatened by the crisis. We believe that now, 
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contrary. The crisis is not a manifestation of a market and deregulation surplus, 
but of a market deficit.
Let us be clear. The market has never been an anarchical construction, but a 
game with well-defined rules; with numerous powers, as well as with imperfections. 
It appeared as a fundamental institution which serves as a solution to the unwanted 
evil, which exists within man. An intimately human construction, situated at the 
intersection point of the difficulties and counter-difficulties that define man and that 
“send” him, instinctively and objectively, on the land of exchange because “man 
almost always needs the help of his fellows” (Smith, 1962, p.13). And it does this 
because only there, on the path of exchange and of competitive markets, will society 
stratify and position each man where he belongs, according to the known criterion of 
consumed work. This is also the opinion of Mises, who sees the market as a 
fundamental “institutional arrangement”, with seen and unseen rules, a machine 
which efficiently consumes human energy, facilitating cooperation with the 
ultimately individual manifestation of action (Mises, 1985). The same view is shared 
by Buchanan, who sees the market as “that institutional process within which 
individuals interact (voluntarily) for pursuing individual objectives ((Buchanan, 
1986, p. 87). Another leader of economic thinking, Hayek reveals the intimately 
contradictory meaning of this institution which, together with private property and 
the freedom of action, defines the free world. This is the normative component, 
through which one resorts to the market as a means of coordination of human 
activities; a means of optimizing the human effort, a “concrete abstraction” through 
which individual plans are adjusted (Hayek, 1990). Here is where conflictive reality 
finds its own compensatory means, thus showing that it is not irreconcilable (Hazlitt, 
1988).  
We could continue, in order to prove, once again, that the market is not the 
best possible solution but, nevertheless, humankind has yet to invent something 
better. If a single example contradicted this hypothesis, we would accept the 
necessary and healthy doubt. But, at the same time, the centralized plan and 
socialism, as portrayed by Stiglitz, have not paid off either. 
We are certainly aware of the risk of our laudatory exposure of the market 
being stopped by means of a down to earth sentence: well, well, we know all these, 
but look that the excessively free market has brought us! We return to the topic in 
order to clarify, once more, a couple of things.  
First of all, the most zealous supporters of liberalism have come to realize 
that the market does not suffice for itself; that its normative valences do not manage 
to relieve tensions in a complex world. It needs rules. And the market has always 
functioned based on formal and informal rules. The more the economies grow in 
complexity, the more they resort to additional rules. The market of the United 
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open market accepts regulation; it accepts rules, imposed via normative means, and 
which establish the behavior poles of actors, the cooperation terms, the nature of the 
goods and services that enter the competitions as penalties for those that do not play 
by the rules. If we accept this premise, an extra level of regulation rendered 
necessary by a special circumstance should not lead the discussion to the state 
interventionism – market dichotomy. Regulation is normally performed by the 
government and the state, the main actor. In reality, regulation must not, within the 
requested and natural limits established only by the complexity of free competition, 
“fall” beyond the market. Within the natural limits it is assimilated to the market 
philosophy per se.
Secondly, the free market is not populated by all kind of actors and all kind of 
goods. The ones that elude or break the rules are eliminated. The damaged 
reputation and the ailing solvency resort either to the civil or to the criminal code. If 
we view things from the material perspective, the free market does not intend to turn 
the consumer into a sovereign by intoxicating him with perishable, damaged or 
harmful products. Their circulation is not regulated, it is forbidden. The same should 
apply for the circulation of financial products that are packaged and re-packaged 
until they become “harmful”. The regulation of the financial market should establish 
the normal course of products that can circulate and should exclude those of 
financial engineering schemes. We consider that, not even with the strictest 
regulations will the harmful products of this market entirely disappear. As long as 
such products are expressly requested, the final path of punitive measures will be 
similar to the path where we ended up by forbidding alcoholic products (vodka) in 
Gorbaciov’s Russia, of drugs in Asian or European countries, of human trafficking 
or organized crime. Although we wish we were not right, the intimately and 
fundamentally “human” nature of the crisis has led us to this conclusion, as we 
intend to show in the following lines.  
Thirdly, the market is a land of competition. Classics, as well as neoclassic, 
perceived it as a struggle between numerous and equal opponents, in term of 
competitive force. Such a competition can be won; with the help of high quality and 
low prices. Pure and perfect competition, as well as Hayek’s catalectic order, was 
portrayed as the optimized images of the free market. But, before reaching these 
unimaginable borders, we have to deal with the world of real cases, of competitive 
markets among unequal opponents, of the struggles between the big and the small, 
of monopolistic competition. Via its very nature, monopoly has always been an 
assault upon the market. When it gains the dimensions of a corporation whose 
turnover exceeds the GDP of a developed state, the problem of regulation attracts 
more attention. When a small number of huge giants such as AIG, the largest 
American insurance company, or Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which own (owned) 
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collapse, the reaction of some officials that are responsible for the economic safety 
and peace of America and of the world makes sense. We can understand why a 
Henry Paulson (general secretary of the Treasury of the United States) or Ben 
Bernanke (chairman of FED) is restless and sends alarming signals: such giants 
cannot die alone, their ramifications in the entire world economy are much too 
numerous and it is impossible for their drift not to affect or to cause significant 
problems for the markets in the entire world. If, under normal circumstances, the 
government – monopoly relation does not pose any problems, since the joining of 
the interests of public and private finances helps them cohabitate, things change in 
times of crisis. Called to perform its duty, the government observes that it has to 
solve a problem which would naturally be the task of the market. Bankruptcy 
eliminated from the game a partner that broke the market line. Meanwhile, this 
partner was assisted by the state in order to abandon the premises of free 
competition. Its power of negotiation exceeds the limits of the market. The 
government itself is powerless when it comes to “its own child”. The myth of the 
powerless state (Weiss, 29) becomes the reality of the powerless state. Its surgical 
extraction from the consequent is not possible without a series of catastrophic 
consequences for the whole. Actions that can be easily performed by the scoop of 
bankruptcy prove to be unconceivable and without traumas through the forceps of 
the state. The only solution is for it to compromise itself. And it does, by helping “its 
product”, beyond and against the market.  
Fourthly, and summarizing, the Washington consensus was not the 
commencement of the evil. Deregulation per se involves a surplus of freedom, 
shifted from the state to the market. And this surplus of freedom has turned out to be 
undisputed, emulative and innovative for the entire range of human activities. 
Incidentally, the initiator of the famous consensus, John Williamson (1989) came up 
with a set of measures, ten, to be specific, meant to support the developing countries 
that were affected by the crisis (also see Boyer, 2001). The critical attitude of some 
economists or economic analysts such as J. Stiglitz or G. Soros assimilated 
William’s statements, in terms of nature and meaning, to the fundamentalism of the 
free market. It is true that the liberalization of trade and deregulation were among 
the ten recommendations. But, from here to interpreting these prescriptions as 
promoting a kind of neoliberalism which transforms the market into a 
“fundamentalist” institution, the road is long. Following this path, sent under the 
form of doctrinarian orientation, in complete confusion (see Rodrik, 2006), China 
and India kept pace and succeeded. Other states that adopted the same 
fundamentalism have to deal with crisis and failure. As concerns the developed 
world, under the empire of the philosophy of this consensus, seen as a total opening 
towards the market, the years that preceded the crisis were among the best. It is 
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encounters an obstacle. You can fix the engine and go on, but you cannot replace it 
with a scooter. And fixing it means indeed regulation, at the same time staying in the 
proximity of the engine. In other words, not all regulation measures are generated by 
the market. On the contrary, we remain inside it and we rethink its rules without 
doubting its stimulating, optimizing and auto-regulatory features; and the capacity of 
producing wealth, undisputed and incomparable with the wealth of other institutions. 
Following this idea, the imperative of the massive intervention of the state in order 
to fight “the blind market forces” has tow risks: 1) the risk of contributing to the 
collapse of an institution which does not deserve such a treatment, not even in 
moments like this; 2) the risk of contributing to the irreversible compromising of the 
referee, and especially of the state.  
At present it is difficult, if not impossible, to deconstruct an analysis which, 
via its conclusions, requires the presence of the state. We cannot persuade people 
that the firemen are not needed when the fire is already burning. It would have been 
better for the spark not to ignite anything; it would have been better to let the market 
solve the problem before stirring panic. After the fire is ignited, the intervention 
becomes “necessary” (Krugman, 2007). The problem is not why the state intervenes 
at this moment, but how we got to the point where such an intervention is necessary. 
As we have already stated, the regulation and supervision deficit was not the cause; 
and neither was the demolition of the banking legislation, with all its consequences 
(simplification and proliferation of agency activities, financial “innovations” in 
relation to the securing and creation of synthetic products, positioned with great 
outputs, but irrelevant for the substance of the wealth in itself, the policy of cheap 
money, etc.) or the emphasis, for two decades, on a single paradigm, that of the 
deregulated market. The cause of the causes sends us back to the beginning of the 
‘80s (Cifelli, 1986; Diaconu, 2005). Then, with Reagan starting off as president, the 
doctrine of the offer was successfully implemented: (which also took from 
monetarism the idea of controlling monetary emissions, initiated by Friedman). The 
experiment took place in a context in which the Asian (mainly Japanese) 
competition had become torrential and was suffocating the American market on its 
own territory. Among other measures, reaganism also meant the putting into 
perspective of the known Sherman Law – the antitrust law of 1890 (May 1987), a set 
of antimonopoly laws concretized in normative acts aimed at regulating competition, 
price policies, mergers and acquisitions. The law wished to express the will of the 
public opinion, of putting an end to the monopolization tendency of the American 
economy and of preventing the domination of the automobile and oil industries by 
two important families, Ford and Rockefeller. Abuses, discriminatory practices, the 
control of the price policy, the creation of companies hidden under the umbrella of 
large monopolies, etc., were deemed to interfere with the spirit of free competition 
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The government did not have to regulate the market, but the abuse against the 
market. The antitrust law was primarily aimed at preserving free market 
competition. It required the intervention of the government in order to fight, with the 
help of legislation, against the main enemy of the free market – the monopoly. It is 
true that, once invited, the government followed the trajectory discovered by Mises 
some years later, by adopting the formula of an objective legislation according to 
which, once the state is invited into a specific segment, the economy, as a whole, 
will “require more and more governing” (Mises, 1944). Starting its journey in order 
to put into practice a social option, the prevention of monopolies, the government 
started to feed itself from the very substance of economy, by means of a gigantesque 
growth. By taking over and claiming responsibility for a series of actions and 
activities that were formerly the exclusive object of the market, either because such 
activities were denied by the market or because the state officials expanded their 
“responsibility” to several domains (Buchanan &Tollison, 1972) in order to justify 
their jobs and salaries. It does not surprise us that, in 1988, the American 
government were described as the biggest: employer, spender, owner, tenant, 
insurer, creditor, debtor and customer (Frederick and others, 1988). The growth 
tendency of the American government continued to progress from 1988 and until 
2008. Despite all these, in 2007, when the crisis started, the USA government did 
not prove to be sufficiently powerful to counterbalance the power of some giants; of 
the companies that, unhindered by the antitrust law, managed to occupy either the 
entire economy or large pieces of it (possibility hinted at by R. Coase in its famous 
article  The Nature of The Firm). The state can no longer fight against such 
economic, financial and banking giants. They are aware of this and defy; either by 
sending their representatives for state help with the helicopter or by honoring their 
managers with bonuses from the borrowed money.  
If the state is called to regulate, this is what he has to do: reestablish the rules 
of competition, defeat monopoly, reintroduce the spirit of free competition, which 
will lead to low prices and high quality. In other words, it has to give back to the 
market the role and the place it should have. If the market needs additional rules, 
they must concern its legislative coherence and the stability of the business 
environment. And if some harmful products already exist on its territory, they must 
not be regulated, they must be forbidden together to the other products that “move” 
them. Thus, we repeat, the risk of the state being compromised is very high. And 
this is due to the fact that, during times of crisis, more than during uneventful times, 
the state is wooed in order to guarantee contracts and in order to become corrupt; in 
order to offer safe jobs to those who failed in private businesses, ending up in 
bureaucracy and paralysis. Making use of its redistributive mechanisms, the state 
takes from those who have played by the market rules in order to make gifts to those 
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manipulative practices: the money does not go back to those from which it was 
taken, but to those which created holes, to companies that do not observe the rules of 
the game; to artificially built companies which will, in the future, compete with the 
ones that can face the crisis without the help of the state.  
4.HUMAN NATURE AND CRISISREPEATABILITY
There is one hope-giving piece of information coming from crises history, 
namely that they are transitory; they come, they create serious trouble or disorder 
and they leave. A new cycle begins when they leave the scene. Regardless of its 
nature and duration (whether it is annual, decennial or centennial), a cycle always 
reaches a peak - crisis. What happens today, comparable only to what history 
witnessed from 1929 to 1933, belongs to the long centennial Kondratieff cycle. 
Should we be tempted, which is only natural, to compare the current crisis with the 
one that occurred at the beginning of the 20
th century, we have every reason to 
believe, at least out of inertia, that this crisis also has a beginning and an ending. 
When it comes to establishing temporal landmarks only the big world players have a 
say in the matter. It is not by accident, and we intend to prove that, that the USA 
were the triggering factor of this phenomenon in both cases. The ending will 
undoubtedly be dictated by the same country. Contagion naturally spreads quicker in 
a globalized world. For these very reasons, this crisis requires adequate global or 
globalized answers. Despite its different amplitude and higher spreading speed, the 
primary deadlock-breaking impulse is still present: the “center” looks for refuge and 
solutions at the expense of the “periphery”. Regardless of the indebtedness level 
(states to states, companies to companies, companies to states and vice-versa, and all 
the above to the IMF, WB or EBRD) and nature, putting an end to this crisis 
depression, despite the cooperation and aggregate effort calls, does not break away 
from the way of the world; a world of domination, having asymmetrical and 
irreversible effects, precisely as Fr. Perroux inspiringly described it, that is from the 
big to the small and never the other way around. The “accuracy” of this 
phenomenon, able to cover up any power abuse or discriminatory practices, turns 
indignation into futility. The world has gotten so much used to this way of the 
world, that the “periphery” states are “rightfully” and joyfully waiting to be 
announced when their ordeal is over.  
It is undoubtedly true that this comparison would also reveal many other 
differences and similarities between now and then. There is hope lurking in the 
background: the current crisis should be shorter. The existing technical and material 
resources, intervention means and specific know-how entitle us to believe that. 
Moreover, beyond a certain limit, which is difficult to trace econometrically, the 
interested parties in overcoming this phenomenon are increasingly numerous and 
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accounting for and supporting this phenomenon called crisis, we focus on another 
cause, which accounts for, from a different point of view, both crisis occurrence and 
repeatability. We are trying, in other words, to answer a perfectly legitimate 
question: will what happened between 1929 and 1933 and what is happening today 
also happen in the near or distance future? Will this phenomenon occur again at the 
end of this century to support Kondratieff’s beliefs (1984) as well as the 
suppositions of other economic cycle theoreticians?  
We dare give an affirmative answer, while not grounding our beliefs on 
technical causes. We rather think that it is human nature that actually accounts for 
the repeatability of such phenomena, which, due to their hideousness and 
devastating and offsetting effects, should be doomed as “unique”.  
We do not claim that we do pioneering work when we say that human nature 
may account to a great extent for what is called economic cyclicity. Keynes’ 
psychological motives that “urge” individuals either to refrain from spending or, on 
the contrary, to increase their consumption appetite prove that the great economist 
was a good connoisseur of the human nature. People’s fondness of investments or 
consumption, their preference for cash, “average opinion” evolution, credit 
condition, “fundamental psychological law” accounting for individual consumption 
behavior depending on income evolution, caution, transaction and speculation 
motives, etc. Here are only some of Keynes’ concepts focusing on human nature. 
Quite a large number of economists still ground their economic crisis studies 
on behavioral patterns (as adjustment responses to euphoria, panic, excess, 
indebtedness appetite, etc.), invoking greed as the all-comprising cause of crisis-
generated chaos. Charles Kindleberger is a good eloquent example. Robert Aliber, 
Robert Solow, with whom Kindleberger actually wrote the famous book Manias, 
Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (2005), are greatly supported, in 
their opinions, by world known economists such as Paul Samuleson. Alan 
Greenspan, another highly respected voice in the crisis analysis world, states, post 
factum, after the onset of the current crisis, whose origin he is actually familiar with, 
that “…these economic and financial cycle models do not fully capture ... the innate 
human responses that result in swings between euphoria and fear that repeat 
themselves generation after generation with little evidence of a learning curve. 
Asset-price bubbles build and burst today as they have since the early 18th 
century… To be sure, we tend to label such behavioral responses as non-rational. 
Current practice is to introduce notions of “animal spirits”, as John Maynard 
Keynes put it. But forecasters’ concerns should be not whether human response is 
rational or irrational, only that it is observable and systematic. This, to me, is the 
large missing “explanatory variable” in both risk-management and macro 
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Greenspan also uses two other concepts: “irrational effusiveness” and “euphoric 
bubbles”.  
We did not use such a long quotation to comment upon it. It speaks for itself. 
We are only interested in the “explanatory variable”, which over-technical 
explanation leave aside, but which is fundamental if we want to grasp the very 
sources of crisis repeatability. The euphoric bubble’s historical nature draws our 
attention; it gradually fills with highly collectively irrational phrases and suddenly 
bursts, destabilizing everything around it, without however acquiring the strength of 
a lesson worth learning. 
What we are trying to point out here, in a world of ideas created by the names 
quoted above, is that a propitious environment makes crisis triggering possible. It 
results from the action and reaction of two categories of players: one that makes 
offers and another that stimulates demand. An assumption is necessary for an 
accurate understanding of the phenomenon: today, just as in the 1929-1933’s, the 
crisis actually started on the loan money field. Although the actual events in the 
1929-1933’s suggested especially an over-production and consumption crisis, and in 
the 2007-200?’s a real estate market crisis, the panic on Wall-Street actually meant 
the same thing in both cases: the breaking of the loan trust chain. Built step by step, 
the “bubble”-permissive environment of over-packed and excessively-secured 
products was created by joint “contribution”; suppliers and buyers joined the dance 
of madness, in the thrall of a game built of trust and “human weakness”. Post 
factum, after the frenzy diminished and the game proved to be a sand castle, the 
guilty party is instinctively looked for and anathema is cast: on the stock exchange 
market that made it possible for illusion to be sold at tempting rates; on the banking 
system, which opened up to casino-type stock exchange operations and poisoned the 
market with uncovered products; on insurers, which gambled their payers’ money on 
the stock exchange market; on the obscure world of intermediaries, which facilitated 
the systematic emergence of synthetic products; on the rating agencies, which 
orchestrated the show giving good grades to doubtful initiatives, etc. If we are open 
to minimum objectivity, we should admit that stock exchanges, banks, insurance 
companies, etc., are not entities that breed by themselves. Their inputs and output 
call to the game a smaller or higher number of participants. Individuals, households, 
companies, dealers, banks, insurance companies, stock exchanges, investment funds, 
pension funds, public institutions, etc., become actors on this stage; they join the 
game, each bringing their own particular contribution to it, and at the same time 
taking the same excessive risk and going deep in debt. 
Synthetically speaking, a human being’s reaction to risk takes the form of 
aversion. People do not like risks. From this point of view, M. Weber classified 
individuals in two categories: the ones that “eat well”, and the ones that have a 
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the price for the desired profit. The other category, significantly bigger, includes 
passive investors, passive depositors who are not disturbed by any possible 
dialectics brought about by the profitable investment involving risks and stress or 
bank deposits with a safe interest equation; they prefer to be passive money savers in 
the absence of any entrepreneurial vocation. That is how Say, Schumpeter and, more 
recently, Knight (2005) put it. In short, taking risks and living with uncertainty in 
not everyone’s “game”. This happens in normal circumstances. But the time before 
the crisis is nothing but normal. It makes everyone leave their passiveness and 
invites them to invest, within the limits of their own budget and psychological 
structure. When the loan offer is irresponsibly permissive, it makes no sense to 
remain a passive money saver. When you can take a loan with nothing but your ID 
card, when you are not asked what your possessions are and if you are able to 
provide any surety, when you are allowed to draft your own refund schedule, to pay 
back whatever and whenever your want, if, last but not least, no one needs to vouch 
for you, it is madness not to get loans. And you do it not because you really need it, 
but because you want to play the market. Why not buy two or three houses and as 
many pieces of land, even at extremely high prices, if you can sell them and make a 
profit before long. The price is not important. What matters is the positive difference 
obtained by resale. Everybody has this purely mercantile logic: creditors, who 
transfer the risks of unsecured loans to intermediaries; intermediaries, who secure 
mortgage loans; other intermediaries who provide loan security; commercial and 
investment banks that join the casino game tempted by quick earnings, preferring 
massive short-term debts and forgetting that in the long run they may walk into a 
trap; individuals or households that find it irrational not to take advantage of such 
offers. Risk exposure is no longer a problem because risk itself is underestimated. 
This picture is made whole and more clearly defined by opportunism, limited 
rationality and incomplete information. When all these are endorsed by scientists, 
the pleasure of living excessively well, even briefly, without worrying that you may 
be penalized in the long run is carefree. And this exactly what happened. In the 
country where the crisis originated, Oliver Williamson, agreeing with Herbert 
Simon’s opinion (1997), replaces homo economicus rationalis with an agent whose 
rationality has certain limitations, derived either from the latter’s inborn features or 
from communication and reformation difficulties. Moreover, by defining lapidary 
opportunism as “the pursuit of one’s personal interest by cheating”, Williamson 
opens the door to behavioral deviations having a false appearance of normality: 
deceit, lie, false promises or threats, manipulation, provision of distorted 
information, etc. (Williamson, 2005). Acknowledged as familiar human behaviors 
and theorized by excellent writers, such behaviors composed the background 
announcing the crisis. Business reputation or ethics have become obsolete. Agents 
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out of the competition, so they joined the game; they got into debt, played the 
market, provided surety, security, blew bubbles and felt happy; no stress and no 
fears.
On the other hand, indebtedness and indebtedness level have always been 
human, and economic, we might add. Regardless of its level, individual, company, 
nations, etc., and up to a certain point it did not prevent progress. On the contrary, 
spending more than you earn has sometimes proved, in different historical 
circumstances and geographical areas, beneficial for individual and community 
development. When their own resources failed, business entities borrowed then, and 
“living off diseconomy” as Keynes said, borrowing and spending now relying on 
future income, proved a trend of modern economy. At least two things draw our 
attention if we want to keep dwelling on the subject. 
First of all, the line or point up to which indebtedness is “normal”. In 
principle, indebtedness is considered from the viewpoint of and as deriving from the 
income-expense relation. When one’s expenses (consumption or investments) 
exceed one’s forces, loans and indebtedness are the solution. In other words, 
indebtedness depends on the current and future income. From this standpoint, 
literature tackles two opinions; one belonging to Keynes, according to whom 
consumption depends on the current income swings, which means that additional 
money would satisfy “cash hunger” and would make loans cheaper; the other due to 
Milton Friedman who believes that only “permanent income” –the swing trend 
coming from a long period of time- has a say in the matter of human consumption or 
saving behavior. The latter states that economy stands intrinsic chances of 
stabilization: in the long run, depending on the “individual life plan” and with higher 
income, agents’ appetence for cash (savings) increases. In other words, a temporary 
and occasional cash infusion is not even considered; it is already insured by the very 
normal operation of economy, an economy which, given its normal growth, also 
needs a normal proportional growth of cash (Friedman, 1960). Even such reasoning, 
regardless of its nuances, does not drive indebtedness beyond supportability. As 
concerns the precise delineation of this supportability, which should separate 
normality from madness, econometric calculations are still being made. Beyond 
such a limit, people will undoubtedly fail to meet their payment obligations, and 
insolvency and bankruptcy will not be far. Determining the critical mass of agents 
whose indebtedness would jeopardize an entire economy is less clear and easy. We 
should add that, even if financial econometrics accurately succeeded in timely 
foreseeing and reporting the occurrence of a serious crisis, it would stand little 
chance to be taken seriously. When everybody is in a frenzy, they do not have time 
to listen to negative signals? When at a wedding party, people listen when you say 
that the bride was stolen, but nobody will listen if you say the groom is dead. The 
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2005, two years before the crisis’ onset, America had the highest indebtedness rate. 
At the same time, just as in 1933, the savings rate was negative. Despite that and 
despite all the warnings, loans went sky high. The offer was so generous that even 
subprime loans with profitability rates slightly (2-4%) exceeding those of the 
government bonds were successful. The failure or delays in paying back the loans, 
bank inability to make payments, stock exchange crash, incipient bankruptcies, etc. 
announced an imminent crisis and the destruction of a system. Nevertheless, the 
show went on until the giants started to fall. The individual life plans tailored 
according to the Nobel price winner Friedman’s “permanent income” were not 
considered. Keynes’ “animal spirits” have accounted for more.  
Secondly, indebtedness, regardless of the entity undertaking it, has the same 
meaning: you borrow to spend more than you earn. The assumption according to 
which indebtedness capacity is limited is also common. Just as the statement 
according to which going into debt is not in itself a positive thing. There are high 
chances are you may feel more comfortable as a creditor than as a debtor. Also, the 
concept of deficit has timeless validity when defining the difference between inputs 
and outputs. Minor differences only lie in units of measurement, settling methods 
and especially in the consequences deriving from indebtedness. We say nothing 
unheard of here. We should bear however in mind that consumption or investment 
loans, based on future income, have been increasingly higher and accompanied by 
increasingly significant risk exposure of all the economic game players. The way in 
which inborn aversion to risk influences financial flexibility, risk acceptance during 
boom periods, unflinching trust in future income, temporary financial imbalance 
spreading corroborated with economic strain stages, the “support” provided by the 
financial and banking system by its own examples (serious reduction of their own 
share in the total capital) etc. say al lot about the trend described above. We believe 
that debt consequences and coverage deserve special attention. Within an averaged-
sized entity (family, company, etc.) indebtedness and debt settlement have the same 
address; the one undertaking the loan risk is also the one that, after crisis onset, is 
penalized for having dared to cross the danger line. His “pain” is a feed-back of his 
own wrong calculations. This does not apply to large corporations or to the state. 
Their mistakes are not always paid for by the ones who made them. Massive state 
intervention, regardless of the manner in which this is done, actually means a 
socialization of losses. Neither great corporations nor the state can become bankrupt 
without avoiding serious imbalances. Also, in these cases, it is actually an innocent 
“human nature” that pays for the mistakes of another “human nature”, who 
undertook great risk exposure. The fact that not only bubble makers, euphoric boom 
people, but the entire population is involved in paying for the mistakes of others, 
turns crisis not only into a psychological certainty of the fact that risk 
underestimation collides with the innate risk aversion, but also into a moment of HUMAN NATURE AND CYCLIC CHARACTER OF ECONOMIC CRISES 27 
maximum social strain, when the very basics of human cooperation are shaken to the 
grounds.  
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